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Principal-agent models with multiple agents typically assume that the principal wishes to
maximize the sum of the agents' achievements (net of the rewards paid to them). But in many
settings, like R&D, all that the principal ‘‘needs’’ is that at least one agent will be ‘‘successful.’’ We
identify settings where the principal actually wants agents to refrain from exerting high effort
in order to save expected compensation. We show that the number of agents can decrease in
the project's value for the principal. We also consider sequential efforts and investigate settings
where the principal can provide support to agents.
1 INTRODUCTION
In many human undertakings, the only result that really matters
is whether the activity ended in success or failure; the definition
of which is often quite clear. In such environments, the cardinal
value of the achievement, beyond constituting a success or not, is
immaterial. Sometimes, success is the achievement of some predeter-
mined threshold. Examples include many types of R&D undertakings,
which attempt to develop a device or procedure that will achieve
a certain performance level (see, e.g., Abernathy & Rosenbloom,
1969; Gerchak & Kilgour, 1999, 2014). In such settings, the task
is completed as soon as at least one of multiple attempts is suc-
cessful. The objective of achieving success is related to, but distinct
from, settings where only the highest achievement of multiple par-
ties matters (Nelson, 1961; Dasgupta & Maskin, 1987; Bard, 1985;
Terwiesch & Xu, 2008).
In agency settings where a principal deploys several ‘‘parallel’’
agents, she may also only be interested whether any of them will
succeed (referred to as ‘‘OR’’ in the computer science literature, e.g.,
Babaioff, Feldman, Nisan, & Winter, 2012) as opposed to a principal
wanting the number of successful agents to be as large as possible, in
line with the common ‘‘sum of outputs’’ objective. Many organizations
make use of several agents in parallel (e.g., R&D teams and athletes
attempting to achieve certain thresholds). These agents sometimes
cannot cooperate due to geographic and/or cultural barriers and
competition within the organization (and they also do not report
partial results to others). Of multiple parallel R&D teams that a firm
(or country) engages, it may only matter whether at least one of
them achieves the goal. For instance, Gerchak and Kilgour (1999)
provide real-world examples of firms employing independent parallel
R&D teams. That is also the motivation for our model. The endeavor
is successful if at least one of the agents succeeds. However, the
principal will have to reward all successful agents.
Our agents do not compete with each other, as the reward depends
on their individual achievement. Thus, our setting is not a contest
(Glazer & Hassin, 1988; Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Canbolat, Golany,
Mund, & Rothblum, 2012; Moldovanu & Sela, 2001). The occasional
practice of firms employing more than one auditor to examine its
entire books instead of dividing their books among auditors (‘‘dual
audits’’) is also an example of a parallel strategy where it is sufficient
that at least one auditor detects relevant irregularities.
Several articles have investigatedmoral hazard situations (where the
principal cannot observe the agents' effort) in multiagent settings to
enhance our understanding of collective effort (e.g., Che & Yoo, 2001;
Baldenius, Glover, & Xue, 2016) or relative performance evaluation
(e.g., Bartling, 2012; Glover, 2012). Sometimes, it is assumed that
agents work ‘‘together’’ to achieve an output. For instance, Itoh (1991)
provides arguments for teamwork. He shows that it can be optimal for
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a principal to incentivize agents to help other agents in accomplishing
their tasks. In contrast to settings with collective effort as in Che and
Yoo (2001) and Baldenius et al. (2016), we consider agents who are
hired to work independently.
Gerchak and Schmid (2016) consider a principal who is only inter-
ested in the highest (or lowest - ‘‘AND’’) achievement of any agent but
on a continuous scale. Here, it is assumed that there exists a thresh-
old, such that only the probability of achieving that threshold matters
to the principal.
Typically, multiagent models with binary effort levels assume that
a principal always wants all agents to provide high effort (e.g., Che
& Yoo, 2001; Glover, 2012). We derive explicit conditions when the
principal prefers agents to refrain from exerting high effort in order to
save expected compensation. In that sense, we enlarge the outcome
space for possible equilibria as compared with previous literature on
multiagent settings.
Besides designing the incentive system, principals often decide how
many parallel agents to engage in a specific task. More agents will
increase administration costs of employment. However, this might not
be the only downside of a greater workforce. Although employing
more agents increases the probability of success, the number of
potential rewards is increasing.
The work of Babaioff et al. (2012), in combinatorial economics,
investigates a setting similar to ours with their nonobservable ‘‘OR’’
technology. Their focus is on how many (and which) agents, of an
available group, should be contracted to exert high effort. In their ‘‘OR’’
setting, the number of agents that should be hired increases one by
one as a principal's profit in case of success increases. We characterize
in detail when two agents, and of what type, are superior/inferior to
a single agent, as a function of the administration cost. We show that
if hiring an agent induces additional administration costs, the number
of agents does not necessarily grow ‘‘smoothly’’ with the project's
value for the principal. For example, it might be favorable to switch
from two low-effort agents (e.g., part-time workers) to one high-effort
worker (e.g., full-time worker) as the project's value increases. A
‘‘follow-up’’ article, Babaioff, Feldman, and Nisan (2010), deals with
mixed strategies. They do not specifically consider a principal who can
provide additional support to the agents.
Levitt (1995) examines a LEN framework where only the best
outcome of multiple agents matters to the principal. He shows that it
can be optimal to pay asymmetric wages for identical agents assigned
to the same task and investigates under what conditions a principal
prefers to employ a single agent rather than two symmetric agents.
As Levitt's model does not provide a closed-form solution of the
optimal asymmetric incentive scheme, however, he has to limit the
latter investigation to some special cases. Our simpler model (without
common production shocks and with binary outcomes) allows for a
general analysis of whether to hire one or two agents.
When success by one of multiple agents is sufficient for a princi-
pal, she might prefer to hire and incentivize independent agents in
sequence. The principal then faces a simple trade-off. If the first agent
was successful, no other agent has to be hired and rewarded for possi-
ble (unnecessary) success subsequently. Yet success at a later point in
time typically reduces the benefits for a firm. In Section 5, we extend
our basic model by allowing engaging agents sequentially. We show
that the discount factor for later revenues always critically affects
the principal's decision whether to employ agents simultaneously or
sequentially. The issue of parallel versus sequential hiring especially
relates to parallel and sequential R&D strategies as discussed, for
instance, by Abernathy and Rosenbloom (1968) and Loch, Terwiesch,
and Thomke (2001). In our model, we abstract from learning effects
that typically promote sequential R&D strategies. Alternatively, Bose,
Pal, and Sappington (2010) show that sequential efforts are beneficial
for the principal if the agents' contributions serve as complements in
their joint performance. The first mover anticipates that high effort
increases the second agent's productivity and thereby the contribu-
tion to the joint performance. Hence, the first mover experiences
an additional motivation to work hard, which allows the principal to
save compensation costs. In contrast, in our setting, all performance
measures are individual and the agents' efforts always constitute
substitutes. Hence, without learning effects, the benefit of sequen-
tial efforts arises by the real option of saving compensation because
already one agent's success is sufficient for the principal.
Section 2 introduces our basic model of success and failure
and explores the optimal reward structure when only one agent is
employed, as a reference point to multiagent models. In Section 3,
we investigate the multiagent environment with a given number of
parallel agents. In Section 4, we investigate how many homogeneous
agents the principal prefers to hire and identify conditions where the
principal refrains from employing additional agents. In Section 5, we
allow agents to deliver effort sequentially and explore when the real
option of not hiring a second agent after prior success outweighs the
expected reduction in the project's value due to discounting. Section
6 extends our analysis of a setting with a fixed number of agents by
allowing for asymmetric agents that differ in their ability. In Sections 7,
we extend our analysis by allowing the principal to support agents. We
focus on situations where the principal has the opportunity to ‘‘help’’
the agents, rather than on cooperation among agents. The support
is assumed to have a similar effect when the agent exerts low effort
to when he exerts high effort. The costs associated with support are
increasing and convex, which seems realistic. In Section 7.1, the prob-
ability of success is assumed to be proportional to the level of support,
possibly with asymmetric agents. Laux (2017) uses a similar concept
of support but assumes that the effectiveness of support depends on
the agents' (unequal) abilities.
1
In Section 7.2, we assume decreas-
ing returns to the principal's level of support. Section 8 concludes
and suggests avenues for future research. The Appendix provides all
proofs.
2 BASIC SET-UP
Any agent (A) employed by a principal (P) makes an unobservable
choice between two types of effort a ∈ {L,H}. A's private costs
of effort are c(L) and c(H), respectively, where high effort is more
costly to A. For the most part of the analysis, we set c(L) = 0 and
c(H) = 1; only in Section 6, we consider heterogeneous agents that
differ in their costs of effort. The outcome of A's effort can either be
success or failure. An agent choosing high (low) effort will succeed
with probability pH (pL), and with probability 1 − pH (1 − pL), the
agent will fail, where pH > pL. In case of success, A is rewarded
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by P with a prize wS ≥ 0, whereas he receives wF ≥ 0 in case of
failure. When A fails, he cannot be fined and made liable. One can
view wF as a ‘‘basic’’ wage and (wS − wF) as a bonus for success.
We assume that wF and wS correspond to the agents' respective
utilities of the prizes. When the agents' preferences are represented
by von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, these utilities are invariant
with respect to linear transformations. Thus, one can assign arbitrary
utilities to two prize values, and thus, risk attitude does not play a
role here. Although P cannot observe the agents' effort choice, all
parameters are common knowledge.
Let DS > 0 denote P's value from the project in case of at least one
agent's success, whereas P receives zero if all agents fail. If multiple
agents participate in the project and some succeed, P's value remains
DS regardless of whether one or several agents were successful. Still,
P has to compensate every agent who succeeds.
Additionally, P incurs administration costs of d > 0, which comprise
recruitment and training costs, for every agent employed, independent
of the agent's effort. As A's personal cost of providing low effort is
zero, this assumption guarantees that P does not want to employ
infinitelymany low-effortworkers. In practice, administration costs are
commonly observed and comprise recruitment costs, nonwage labor
costs, lump-sum taxes, and basic working equipment, or office space.
The administration costs can be ignored whenever we investigate the
reward structure of a fixed number of agents, as the administration
costs are sunk at that point. Only if P has to decide on the optimal
workforce size must she incorporate d into her decision making.
2.1 Single agent
First, we will investigate the reward structure in a basic model with a
single agent. The participation constraints (PCs) for an agent supplying
high or low effort are,
pHwS + (1 − pH)wF ≥ 1 and (PCH)
pLwS + (1 − pL)wF ≥ 0, (PCL)
respectively. The (ex ante) PC guarantees that, in expectation,
the agent receives at least his reservation utility, which is equal
to zero.
As the agent's costs of low effort are zero, an agent providing low
effort does not have to be compensated. Thus, P will setwS = wF = 0
and P's expected profit is pLDS − d. In order for A to exert high effort,
(PCH) must hold and A must be better off by exerting high effort; thus,
P faces an additional incentive compatibility constraint:
pHwS + (1 − pH)wF − 1 ≥ pLwS + (1 − pL)wF . (IC1)
Because prizes have to be nonnegative, the (IC1) constraint guar-
antees that (PCH) holds. P's optimization problem is then to minimize
expected rewards paid to the agent. Pwill optimally setwF = 0 and the
prize for success as small as possible, that is, wS = 1∕(pH − pL) = ∶ W.
P's expected profit in this equilibrium is then pH (DS −W) −d. Compar-
ing the equilibrium outcomes, we see that P will prefer the agent to





3 MULTIPLE HOMOGENEOUS AGENTS
Next, we consider the basic model with a fixed number of multiple
symmetric agents who choose their effort level simultaneously. We
do not restrict our analysis to symmetric contracts, so agents can be
rewarded differently. If two agents can be treated differently, in our









. Missing superscripts indicate that agents receive the same
contracts.
As P observes the agents' individual success, the reward for each
agent could depend on both agents' outcomes and thus their peers'
performances. However, in absence of a common shock, P cannot
benefit from relative performance evaluation (see Glover, 2012). Con-





, i ∈ {1,2}, which reflect individual performance evaluation.
Any agent iwho is successful will be rewarded with wi
S
, and with wi
F
if the agent fails. The other agents' effort and success do not influence
agent i's optimization problem and the reward structure will depend
on whether P wants agents to exert high effort or not. If P prefers
agents to exert high effort, (IC1) must hold and thus the prizes will be
wi
F
= 0 and wi
S
= W. If, in contrast, agents should provide low effort, P
only has to make sure that the participation constraint for low effort





Suppose first that P has to write symmetric contracts for all agents.
Then, when two agents participate, comparing P's expected profits,
we find that high effort is desirable if and only if
𝜋(H,H) > 𝜋(L, L) ⇐⇒ DS > DS(2) ∶=
2pH
(pH − pL)2 (2 − pH − pL)
, (2)
where 𝜋(a1, a2) denotes P's expected profit when Agent 1 (2) provides
effort a1 (a2) with (a1, a2) ∈ {L,H} × {L,H}, and DS(2) = DS(1) ·
2∕(2 − pH − pL) > DS(1). Both profits 𝜋(H,H) = pH(2 − pH)DS −
2pH∕(pH − pL) − 2d and 𝜋(L, L) = pL(2 − pL)DS − 2d show a linear
increase in DS , but 𝜋(H,H) with a steeper slope. Also, 𝜕𝜋(H,H)∕𝜕pH =
2DS(1 − pH) + 2pL∕(pH − pL)2 > 0, whereas an increase in pH does
not change P's expected profit in case of two low-effort agents.
Generally, P prefers n agents to exert high rather than low effort if
and only if




(1 − pL)n − (1 − pH)n
) . (3)
So, as in the single-agent setting, only if the principal's value from
the project is sufficiently high will she incentivize agents to provide
high effort.
Lemma 1. The principal's value from the project required to prefer
agents to exert high effort is increasing with the number of agents
employed.
Lemma 1 indicates that when the number of agents employed at a
project increases, the parameter region where P wants all agents to
exert high effort becomes smaller.
Now, we allow that Agent 1 receives a different contract than Agent
2 (even though all agents are equally skilled).Without loss of generality,
P wants Agent 1 to exert high effort, whereas Agent 2 should provide
low effort. Employing a low-effort (for example, part-time) worker
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still causes administration costs of d. As a low-effort worker does







= 0 and w1
S
= W, to incentivize Agent 1 to provide high effort.
Proposition 1 establishes that P will not always treat symmetric agents
equally.
Proposition 1. There exists a nonempty region where the principal
prefers asymmetric contracts for two symmetric agents, that is,
𝜋(H, L) > max{𝜋(H,H), 𝜋(L, L)} for DS ∈ (A1,A2) where A1 and A2
are values such that A1 < DS(2) < A2. The Appendix provides the
values for A1 and A2.
4 ONE VERSUS TWO AGENTS
In the previous section, we assumed that the number of agents
employed is fixed. In practice, however, P is often not only responsible
for designing the incentive systems but also decides how many agents
are hired in the first place. The trade-off is between the positive
contribution of additional agents to the probability of at least one
success, and the need to reward (possibly) more successful agents and
pay additional administration costs. We will restrict our investigations
to scenarioswith two symmetric agents and compare itwith employing
a single agent. For simplicity, we will focus on equilibria in pure
strategies but allow for asymmetric contracts. As hiring takes place
before P sets prizes, we solve for the optimal employment decision
by backward induction, where optimal incentives have already been
established in the previous sections.
In the single agent case, we have already established that 𝜋(H) >
𝜋(L) if DS > DS(1) = pH∕(pH − pL)2. For two agents, we have already
shown that𝜋(H,H) > 𝜋(L, L) ifDS > DS(2), whereDS(2) = 2pH∕[(pH −
pL)2(2 − pH − pL)], and similarly, 𝜋(H, L) > 𝜋(L, L) if DS > A1 and
𝜋(H,H) > 𝜋(H, L) if DS > A2, where D(1) < A1 < D(2) < A2.
However, we also have to compare when P prefers to hire a single
agent to the scenarios of hiring two agents. P's preferred number of
agents will depend on the administration costs d. To avoid numerous
case distinctions, we will assume, in the sequel, that
pH > 2pL − p2L . (4)
This condition assures that the probability of success of one
high-effort agent is larger than the joint probability of success of two
low-effort agents.
2
While agents providing low effort do not have to be compensated,
every agent causes administration cost of d. Thus, P prefers to employ
two low-effort agents instead of one if d is sufficiently small. Formally,




Similarly, P prefers two high-effort agents to one high-effort agent,
that is 𝜋(H,H) > 𝜋(H), if DS > (pH − d(pH − pL))∕[(pH − pL)pH(1 −
pH)] = ∶ V5. Similar calculations show that 𝜋(L, L) > 𝜋(H) if DS >
(pH−d(pH−pL))∕[(pH−pL)(pH−2pL+p2L )] =∶ V2. Finally, 𝜋(H,H) > 𝜋(L)
if DS > (d(pH − pL) + 2pH)∕[(pH − pL)(2pH − p2H − pL)] (> DS(1)).
Comparing a single agent to asymmetric contracts for two agents
shows that 𝜋(H, L) > 𝜋(L) if DS > (pH + d(pH − pL))∕[(pH − pL)pH(1 −
pL)] = ∶ V3, and 𝜋(H, L) > 𝜋(H) if DS > d∕[(1 − pH)pL] = ∶ V4.
Some calculations show that A1 = V2 if d = pH(1 − pH)pL∕[(pH −
pL)2(1 − pL)] = ∶ d1, D(1) = V2 if d = pH(1 − pL)pL∕(pH − pL)2 =∶ d2,
and A2 = V5 if d = pHpL∕(pH − pL)2 =∶ d3, where condition (4)
guarantees that 0 < d1 < d2 < d3.
In order for P to hire any agent, her expected profit has to be
positive. In particular, P prefers hiring one low-effort agent rather than
not if DS > d∕pL. Similarly, P prefers one high-effort agent over not
hiring this agent if DS > W + d∕pH . Comparing these two thresholds
for the project's value, we find that the latter is smaller if and only if
d > d3.
Dependent on the level of the administration costs, P's optimal
choice of the number of agents and the preferred level of effort(s)
vary significantly. For instance, if d is sufficiently small, that is, if
d < d1 holds, we find that V1 has the smallest value of all thresholds
for possible regime changes.
3
Thus, P prefers a single agent exerting
low effort if DS < V1. Because P's profits are positive if DS > d∕pL,
she will hire a single agent providing low effort if DS ∈ [d∕pL,V1]. If
DS increases above V1, P will hire an additional agent, but both will
provide low effort. Because for d < d1, V2 > A1 holds, this strategy
is dominant for DS ∈ [V1,A1]. For DS ∈ [A1,A2], P prefers different
contracts if two agents are hired. As D(1) < A1 and V4 < A1 hold
in this scenario, P also prefers asymmetric contracts over hiring a
single agent. Because V3,V4 < A2, P will change to employing two
high-effort agents if DS increases further such that DS > A2.
Proposition 2 describes P's preferred workforce and effort levels
for all possible values of the administration costs.
Proposition 2. If pH > 2pL−p2L holds, P's choice between one versus
two agents is as follows.
(i) If d < d1, (L) is optimal for d∕pL < DS < V1, (L, L) for DS ∈
[V1,A1], (H, L) for DS ∈ [A1,A2], and (H,H) for DS > A2.
(ii) If d ∈ [d1, d2], (L) is optimal for d∕pL < DS < V1, (L, L) for
DS ∈ [V1,V2], (H) for DS ∈ [V2,V4], (H, L) for DS ∈ [V4,A2],
and (H,H) for DS > A2.
(iii) If d ∈ [d2, d3], (L) is optimal for d∕pL < DS < DS(1), (H)
for DS ∈ [DS(1),V4], (H, L) for DS ∈ [V4,A2], and (H,H) for
DS > A2.
(iv) If d > d3, (H) is optimal for DS ∈ [W + d∕pH,V5], and (H,H) for
DS > V5.
We see that, dependent on the administration costs, P's preferred
workforce and types of effort vary significantly. For instance, for
d ∈ [d1, d2], as DS increases, P will change from hiring one low-effort
agent to two low-effort agents at V1, to a single high-effort agent
at the threshold V2, to two differently rewarded agents at V4 and
two high-effort agents at A2. Hence, Proposition 2 establishes that
P's hiring decision does not necessarily follow a monotone pattern.
Rather, it is possible that the number of agents decreases as the
project's value increases.
For the specific probabilities of success pH = 0.4 and pL = 0.1,
we have d1 = 8∕27 ≈ 0.30, d2 = 0.40, d3 = 4∕9 ≈ 0.44, A1 =
400∕81 ≈ 4.9, A2 = 200∕27 ≈ 7.4, V1 = 100d∕9 ≈ 11.1d, V2 =
(400 − 300d)∕63, V3 = (100 + 75d)∕27, V4 = 50d∕3 ≈ 16.7d
and V5 = (100 − 75d)∕18. P's expected profit 𝜋(L) is positive for
DS > 0.4d, and 𝜋(H) > 0 if DS > (20 + 15d)∕6 ≈ 3.33 + 2.5d. For
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FIGURE 1 Employment of one versus two agents for varying
magnitudes of the project's value DS and administration costs d. The
parameters are pH = 4∕10 and pL = 1∕10
this example, the regions of optimality of the various hiring options
from Proposition 2 are depicted in Figure 1.
5 SEQUENTIAL EFFORTS
Up to now, we only considered agents that deliver their efforts
simultaneously. Alternatively, a firm can induce independent agents to
work sequentially. For two agents, Section 3 shows the solution to the
principal's problem for simultaneous effort. If the principal employs
agents in series, the principal will employ a second agent (i.e., Agent
2) only if the first agent (Agent 1) failed because in our setting, it is
sufficient that one agent succeeds. Hence, the principal can benefit
from the real option of not employing the second agent afterobserving
the first agent's success. Yet sequential efforts come at a cost for the
principal reflected by the discounting of the project's value realized
at a later point in time. Specifically, P's expected profit of employing
agents sequentially is
max{0, p1(DS − w1S ) − d} + (1 − p1)𝛿 max{0, p2(DS − w
2




where p1 ∈ {pL, pH} and p2 ∈ {pL, pH} depict the probability of
success of Agents 1 and 2, respectively, and 𝛿 ∈ [0,1] is the discount
factor.
In order to incentivize Agent 2 to exert high effort, after observing
the first agent's success, the principal sets w2
S
= W, and w2
S
= 0,
to induce low effort. Solving by backward induction (at the end of
the first period, the second period becomes the current period, so
no discounting is needed here), the principal generally employs the
second agent if and only if
d < max{pLDS, pH(DS −W)} =∶ d0, (6)







≥ 0 denote the maximized expected profit generated by the
second agent. In particular, Π∗
2
> 0 if d < d0. For d ≥ d0, P does not
hire a second agent, so Π∗
2
= 0. Consequently, for d ≥ d0, the second
agent is irrelevant and P's decision whether to hire the first agent
is also determined by condition (6). If this condition holds, P hires
two agents sequentially, if not, no agent is hired. Hence, sequential
employment of two agents always dominates committing to employ a
single agent.















The discount factor critically affects whether the principal prefers
simultaneous or sequential efforts, and sequential efforts become
more favorable for increasing values of 𝛿. Consider the case when
the principal prefers two high-effort agents under both regimes
and let 𝛱(H,H)seq and 𝛱(H,H)sim denote the principal's expected
profits of agents working sequentially, or simultaneously, respec-
tively. Comparing the expected profits yields that the decision
whether high-effort agents should work simultaneously or in series
always depends on the discount factor, as captured in the fol-
lowing Proposition 3. Similar comparisons can be made for the
whole parameter region, with agents not necessarily providing high
effort.
FIGURE 2 Optimal strategy with two agents for varying magnitudes
of the project's value DS and the discount factor 𝛿. The parameters
are pL = 1∕10, pH = 3∕10, and d = 1∕3
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Proposition3. For high-effort agents, the discount factor that deter-
mines whether the principal prefers agents to work simultaneously or
sequentially has always an interior solution. Particularly,
Π(H,H)seq > Π(H,H)sim ⇐⇒ 𝛿 > pH[(1 − pH)DS −W] − d
(1 − pH)(pHDS − pHW − d)
=∶ 𝛿,
(9)
where 0 < 𝛿 < 1.
Figure 2 presents an example of the principal's preferred strategy
for two agents for varying magnitudes of the project's value and the
discount factor.
6 ASYMMETRIC AGENTS
In our analysis above, all agents are homogeneous. In this section, we
allow agents to differ in their ability. More specifically, let us denote
a ‘‘good' agent by G and a ‘‘bad’’ agent by B. When P hires agents,
she does not know the agents' type. However, the fraction of good
agents, q, is public knowledge.
Both types of agents can either exert high (H) or low (L) effort, and
their effort can result in success or failure. The respective probabilities
of success are 0 ≤ pGL < pGH ≤ 1 for G, and 0 ≤ pBL < pBH ≤ 1 for
B, where pBL < pGL and pBH < pGH . Additionally, we assume that
pGH − pGL ≥ pBH − pBL (i.e., pGH − pBH ≥ pGL − pBL), (10)
which expresses that G benefits more from high effort than B4 .
Additionally, exerting high effort can be more costly for a bad agent.
Although, as in the previous sections, the costs of providing high effort
are c(H) = 1 for a good agent, b ≥ 1 captures the monetized value of
effort for a bad-type agent.
5
In this section, the agents are risk neutral.
6.1 Single agent of unknown type
The incentive constraints for the two types of agents are








where we already incorporated thatwF = 0 in equilibrium. Assumption
(10) and b ≥ 1 guarantee that MG ≤ MB . Hence, P finds it easier to
motivate G to exert high effort. In fact, if wS ≥ M
B holds, both types
select H, but if MG ≤ wS < M
B , only G selects H and B selects L.
Alternatively, if rewards are too low, that is, wS < M
G , both types
select L.
Consequently, P has three options:
(i) wS = MB . Then P's expected profit is
qpGH(DS −MB) + (1 − q)pBH(DS −MB) − d
= [qpGH + (1 − q)pBH]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
=∶pH
(DS −MB) − d. (13)
(ii) wS = MG . Then P's expected profit is
qpGH(DS −MG) + (1 − q)pBL(DS −MG) − d
= [qpGH + (1 − q)pBL]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
=∶p
(DS −MG) − d. (14)
(iii) wS = 0. Then P's expected profit is
qpGL(DS − 0) + (1 − q)pBL(DS − 0) − d
= [qpGL + (1 − q)pBL]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
=∶pL
DS − d, (15)
where pH > p > pL.
Comparing P's expected profits reveals























In that case, if DS ≥ D1, (i) is best; if D3 ≤ DS ≤ D1, (ii) is best; and
if DS ≤ D3, (iii) is best. If b is sufficiently small so that (19) does not
hold, (iii) is best if DS < D2 and (i) is best if DS > D2. Condition (19),
however, is only informative if the rhs is larger than 1.
6.2 Two agents of unknown type
When P employs two agents, she has the same three options of setting
the prizes:
(i) wS = MB , so that both types select H and P's expected profit is
?̃?(H,H) = pH
{
DS(2 − pH) − 2MB
}
− 2d, (20)
where ?̃?(aG, aB) denotes P's expected profit with two agents if
any G-type agent provides aG and any B-type agent provides aB ,
with aG , aB ∈ {L,H}.
(ii) wS = MG , so that G selects H and B selects L. Then P's expected
profit is
?̃?(H, L) = p
{
DS(2 − p) − 2MG
}
− 2d. (21)
(iii) wS = 0, so that both types select L.
?̃?(L, L) = pLDS(2 − pL) − 2d. (22)
Comparing expected profits of the three options, we find
?̃?(H, L) > ?̃?(L, L) ⇐⇒ DS >
2pMG
p(2 − p) − pL(2 − pL)
∶= D̃3, (23)
?̃?(H,H) > ?̃?(L, L) ⇐⇒ DS >
2pHMB
pH(2 − pH) − pL(2 − pL)
∶= D̃2, (24)
?̃?(H,H) > ?̃?(H, L) ⇐⇒ DS >
2pHMB − 2pMG
pH(2 − pH) − p(2 − p)
∶= D̃1, (25)
where





[pH(2 − pH) − pL(2 − pL)]
[p(2 − p) − pL(2 − pL)]
=∶ b̃.
(26)
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If b̃ ≤ 1, (26) holds, as b > 1 per assumption. If DS = 0, we
find ?̃?(L, L) > ?̃?(H, L) > ?̃?(H,H) because MB ≥ MG and pH > p.
However, all three expected profits are linearly increasing in DS ,
where 𝜕?̃?(H,H)∕𝜕DS > 𝜕?̃?(H, L)∕𝜕DS > 𝜕?̃?(L, L)∕𝜕DS for all DS > 0.
Consequently, if DS is sufficiently high, ?̃?(H,H) is best for P.
More specifically, if the bad agent's costs of high effort are moder-
ate, that is, 1 ≤ b ≤ b̃, P will want both agents to exert the same level
of effort, because for DS ∈ [0, D̃2], ?̃?(L, L) is best, and ?̃?(H,H) is best
for DS ≥ D̃2. Else, if b is sufficiently high, that is, b > b̃, there exists a
region where asymmetric contracts are preferred by P, in the sense
that a G-type agent exerts high effort, whereas a B-type agent exerts
low effort. That is, for b > b̃, ?̃?(L, L) is best for DS ∈ [0, D̃3], ?̃?(H, L) for
DS ∈ [D̃3, D̃1], and ?̃?(H,H) for DS ≥ D̃1.
As a consequence of the result above, we can conclude that
for increasing b, which can be interpreted as an indicator for the
agents' heterogeneity, asymmetric contracts are more likely to appear.
Formally, if b > b̃, D̃1 is increasing in b, so the interval for DS ,
where ?̃?(H, L) is best, becomes larger. Intuitively, as it becomes more
expensive to motivate a B-type agent to exert high effort, the (H,H)
equilibrium becomes less attractive.
7 SUPPORT BY THE PRINCIPAL
7.1 Support with two homogeneous agents
In the basic model, the agents' effort choice determines the proba-
bility of success. However, in many situations, P has an opportunity
to support agents in order to be successful, for example, by provid-
ing guidance, expertise, information, or better working conditions. For
example, a university provides its faculty members with an office, fur-
niture, equipment, and other help in research. To induce a researcher
to publish more and more, however, increasing increments of support
will be needed. Because P cannot observe whether agents provided
high or low effort, support will influence the probability of success
associatedwith both types of effort. We firstmodel support in a simple
manner, such that both probabilities are multiplied by a factor denoted
by z. Consequently, an agent exerting high effort will be successful
with probability z · pH , and the low-effort agent with probability z · pL.
If P selects z = 1, the agents receive no support from the principal.
More specifically, we extend the basic model so that P can influence
the probability of success by a factor z ∈ [1, z̄] with 1 < z̄ < 1∕pH. Pro-
viding support will usually induce costs for P. Let C(z) denote direct
costs P has to bear for maintaining support at level z, where C(1) = 0
and C(z) is increasing and convex in z (see also Laux, 2017). In this
section, we will restrict our attention to equilibria in pure strategies
with symmetric contracts. Before the agents choose their effort, they
are assumed to know the level of support P will provide.
The PCs for agents supplying high or low effort are
zpHwS + (1 − zpH)wF ≥ 1 and (PCzH)
zpLwS + (1 − zpL)wF ≥ 0, (PCzL)
respectively.
If two agents exert low effort, P does not have to compensate the
agents, that is, wF = wS = 0, and P's expected profit is 𝜋(L, L) =
(2zpL − z2p2L )DS − C(z) − 2d. Thus, the optimal level of support z
∗ will
solve the FOC
2pL(1 − z∗pL)DS = C′(z∗). (27)
At the optimum, the marginal increase in the expected profit by
providing support equals the marginal cost of support.
If P wants the agents to exert high effort, P's optimization problem
is subject to the additional incentive constraint,
zpHwS + (1 − zpH)wF − 1 ≥ zpLwS + (1 − zpL)wF . (ICz)
If (ICz) holds, this implies that (PCz
H
) holds. As P will set wF = 0 at
the optimum, the optimization can be stated as
max
wS ,z
(2zpH − z2p2H)DS − 2zpHwS − C(z) (28)




P will optimally set wS to its lower bound, wS = W∕z. The first
derivative of (28) with respect to z then yields




Apparently, increasing support affects P in various ways. The first
term accounts for the higher probability of success and, thus, higher
expected profits. The second term, however, indicates that support
also increases the probability that P has to pay compensation, which
reduces her expected profits. On the other hand, the prize P has to
award for success, wS = W∕z, which becomes smaller as support
increases, so that the partial derivative is negative and thus the
third term positive. Finally, the last term depicts the marginal cost of
support. Substituting the optimal prize, we find that the second and
third terms cancel each other out, and so, the FOC with respect to
support simplifies to
2pH(1 − zpH)DS = C′(z). (31)
Again, the marginal increase in expected profits equals the marginal
cost of providing support.
If both As had to be successful in order to constitute a project's
success, the likelihood ratio would be
Pr(both agents succeed|(L, L))









which is independent of z. However, in our setting,
Pr(at least one agent succeeds|(L, L))
Pr(at least one agent succeeds|(H,H)) = 1 − (1 − zpL)
2
1 − (1 − zpH)2




which does depend on z.
7.2 Diminishing returns of support
We now model P's influence on the probabilities of success via a
concave power function. P can choose support u ∈ [0,1] such that an
agent exerting high effortwill be successfulwith probability 1+pH−puH.
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Low values of u therefore indicate a low level of support, whereas
high levels of u indicate high support. For instance, if P selects u = 0,
the probability of success for an agent exerting high effort remains
pH; that means that the agent does not receive any ‘‘help’’ from P. In
contrast, u = 1 indicates full support. In that case, an agent exerting
high effort will certainly be successful.
Because P cannot observe whether agents provided high or low
effort, support will influence both types of agents. More precisely,
when P chooses support u, a low-effort agent will achieve success
with probability k(1+ p̂L − p̂uL)with k < 1, where in case of no support,
that is, u = 0, kp̂L = pL. Even if P decides to fully support the agents,
so u = 1, an agent exerting low effort will not always be successful




k < 1 and all 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. Again, in our setting, support influences the
likelihood ratio of success, which, in consequence, leads to different
incentives as compared with the basic model in Section 2. We will
later refrain from assuming costly support, that is, we shall assume
C(u) = 0∀ u, in order to highlight potential negative consequences of
supporting that can arise even without any direct costs.
The participation constraints for a single agent supplying high or
low effort are
(1 + pH − puH)wS + (p
u




k(1 + p̂L − p̂uL)wS + (1 − k(1 + p̂L − p̂
u




respectively. If P cannot observe the agent's action and wants the
agent to exert high effort, P's optimization problem is subject to the
additional incentive constraint,
(1 + pH − puH)wS + (p
u
H − pH)wF − 1 ≥ (k + kp̂L − kp̂
u
L)wS
+ (1 − k − kp̂L + kp̂uL)wF . (IC
u)
If (ICu) holds, this implies that (PCu
H
) holds. So, if P wants the agent




(1 + pH − puH)(DS − wS) − (p
u
H − pH)wF − C(u)
}
(34)
s.t. (1 + pH − puH − k − kp̂L + kp̂
u
L)wS (35)
≥ (1 + pH − puH − k − kp̂L + kp̂
u
L)wF + 1.
Because (1 + pH − puH − k − kp̂L + kp̂
u
L
) > 0, we can infer that P will





(1 + pH − puH)(DS − wS) − C(u)
}
(36)
s.t. (1 + pH − puH − k − kp̂L + kp̂
u
L)wS ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ (37)
wS ≥
1




P will optimally set wS to its minimum, wS = 1∕(1 + pH − puH − k −
kp̂L + kp̂uL).
In order to highlight negative consequences of support, we now
assume that support is free, C(u) = 0 ∀u. Substituting the prizes into











where Q(u) ∶= 1 + pH − puH −
(
k + kp̂L − kp̂uL
)
> 0. Thus, the derivative








(1 + pH − puH)(−p
u
H
ln(pH) + kp̂uL ln(p̂L))
Q(u)2
. (39)
So, for the derivative to be positive, we need that
(1 + pH − puH)
[
















Condition (40) holds for k sufficiently small or DS sufficiently large.
Only then will P optimally set u = 1, that is, P will choose full support.
However, if, for instance, DS is sufficiently small, P will optimally
refrain from providing support. From the basic model in Section 2.1,
we know that if P wants the single agent to exert low effort, she will
set wF = wS = 0. In that case, maximum support is optimal, so that
u = 1 and P's expected profit is k(1 + p̂L − p̂1L )DS = kDS.
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We analyze a multiagent model where it only matters to P whether
at least one A was successful. If P can also decide on the size of the
workforce, she faces a trade-off employing an additional agent. Every
additional agent increases the probability that at least one agent is
successful. However, besides additional administration costs P has
to bear, as the number of agents increases, the number of potential
rewards P has to pay increases too. We identify conditions when P
refrains from employing additional agents but would rather employ a
single agent that exerts high effort. Also, we show that the number of
agents preferably employed by P is not necessarily monotone in the
project's value for the principal. Usually, higher project values increase
the principal's demand for additional agents. However, depending on
the administration costs, it is possible that when the principal's value
from the project increases, she prefers a single (high-effort) agent over
two (low-effort) agents. As an extension, we then consider sequential
efforts by agents. We further allow for asymmetric agents, where
P ex ante does not know the agents' abilities. We then allow P to
support (help) the agents by increasing their success probability. We
consider support that multiplies the probabilities, as well as one that
exponentializes them.
We believe that our analysis provides various avenues for further
extensions and future research. In one such scenario, P may know the
agents' types, reflected in their probabilities of success and/or their
costs of exerting high effort, but be required (by law) to offer all an
identical contract.
Although we assumed that the agents work on the same
task/project independently, one can conceive of situations where the
agents' achievements are positively correlated (either due to common
external factors or due to some degree of team work). In contrast
to our setting, a principal can then benefit from relative performance
evaluation. There are also scenarios where, instead of asking all agents
to try to (successfully) complete the entire task, the principal splits it
and gives each agent a different subtask. That will require all agents
SCHMID AND GERCHAK 9
to be successful, but if so, the project can be completed faster. This is
the motivation behind outsourcing, subcontracting, division of labor,
and specialization.
ENDNOTES
1 The principal's main goal in Laux (2017) is to use support to supplement
monitoring to make inferences about the agents' abilities so as to
decide who to retain employed.
2 If, in contrast, pH < pL(2 − pL), the joint probability of success of
two low-effort agents is larger than the probability of success of one
high-effort agent. Because P does not need to compensate agents
providing low effort, incentivizing one agent to work hard is always a
dominated strategy.
3 That is, V1 = min{A1,A2,V1,V2,V3,V4,V5}.
4 Presumably, relative to the probabilities of success with symmetric
agents, pBH ≤ pH ≤ pGH and pBL ≤ pL ≤ pGL .
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APPENDIX








⇐⇒ (1 − pL)n(1 + npL)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
=∶f(pL ,n)









= −n(1 + n)(1 − p)n−1p. (A2)
Thus, for p ∈ (0,1) and n ≥ 1, this derivative will always be
negative, and f(p, n) is decreasing in p. Because 0 < pL < pH < 1,
that means that f(pL, n) > f(pH, n) for all n ≥ 1, and consequently,
the rhs of (3) is increasing in the number of agents employed.
Proof of Proposition 1. P's expected profit in case of asymmetric
contracts for two symmetric agents is




+ (1 − pH)pLDS − 2d, (A3)
= (pH + pL − pHpL)DS − pHW − 2d, (A4)
where
𝜋(H, L) > 𝜋(L, L) ⇐⇒ DS >
pH
(pH − pL)2(1 − pL)
∶= A1 and (A5)
𝜋(H,H) > 𝜋(H, L) ⇐⇒ DS >
pH
(pH − pL)2(1 − pH)
∶= A2. (A6)
For 0 < pL < pH < 1, there exists a nonempty region, that
is, DS ∈ [A1,A2], with A1 < DS(2) < A2, where P prefers
asymmetric contracts for two symmetric agents.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Part (i) in text. The proofs for the other
parts work analogously. For (iv), the threshold that 𝜋(H) is positive
is DS > W + d∕pH . However, for d > d3, we find DS(1) <
W + d∕pH . Hence, both a low-effort and a high-effort single agent
yield negative profits for DS < DS(1).
Proof of Proposition 3. Inspecting the threshold in (9), on the one
hand, 𝛿 < 1 if pH(DS − W) > d, which must hold because else hir-
ing a high-effort agent would result in negative expected profits.
Hence, the denominator in (9) is positive, and 𝛿 > 0 if DS >
(pHW + d)∕[pH(1 − pH)]. This condition is necessary for P ex ante
to prefer high effort by two simultaneous agents over a single
high-effort agent. Because we only consider scenarios where
(H,H)sim is P's preferred strategy in the simultaneous efforts
setting, we conclude that 0 < 𝛿 < 1.
